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The Incentive Problems with the
All-or-Nothing Crowdfunding Model
Garry A. Gabison*
This paper discusses how the all-or-nothing model can disincentivize
crowd investors to perform due diligence over the fraud or failure risks of a
crowdfunding campaign. Specifically, the major upside of this model is
that a project cannot be funded without a critical mass investing. If enough
individuals in this critical mass of crowd investors perform their due
diligence to check whether projects will become successful, then the model
functions correctly; instead, this paper argues that this model incentivizes
the crowd to produce noisy information that cannot be relied upon. In the
all-or-nothing model, sequential investments encourage rational investors
to not perform their due diligence because they relied on the self-interest of
prior investors to perform their own due diligence while non-fully rational
investors may rely on the belief that prior investors have better information
than they might gather. Allowing campaigns to be overfunded can
exacerbate some of the all-or-nothing model characteristics. This paper
concludes by discussing how the platforms, campaign creators, and crowd
investors can be incentivized to better filter projects  in order to assure
that crowdfunding fulfills its potential.
I. INTRODUCTION
Crowdfunding is “a new and evolving method to raise money using
the Internet.”1 For the purpose of this paper, crowdfunding means the
process through which an individual or an entity raises funds using an
* J.D. from the University of Virginia School of Law and Ph.D. in Economics from Yale
University. Research Fellow at the European Commission’s Joint Research Center Institute for
Prospective Technological Studies. This paper was written with the financial support of the European
Innovation Policies for the Digital Shift, a project jointly launched in 2013 by JRC-IPTS and DG
CONNECT of the European Commission. The content of this report does not reflect the official
opinion of the European Commission. Responsibility for the information and views expressed in the
report lies entirely with the author. All errors and opinions are my own.
1. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,430 n. 20 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240 & 249). The rules became final on Oct. 30, 2015. See Press Release, SEC,
SEC Adopts Rules to Permit Crowdfunding (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/press
release/2015-249.html.
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internet website, called a fundraising portal, from a large number of
individuals, referred to as the crowd.2
Crowdfunding comes in four varieties.3 Most of them use a model
called the all-or-nothing model to fundraise through online portals: the allor-nothing model specifies that a fundraising portal only disburse the funds
to the fundraiser if the crowd's investment reaches or exceeds a
preestablished threshold; otherwise, the portal returns their investment to
the crowd.
The all-or-nothing model has been used in various settings.
Kickstarter, the most successful crowdfunding reward-based platform, uses
this model.4 In 2012, the United States passed the Jumpstart Our Business
Startups Act (“JOBS Act”).5 The JOBS Act puts in place measures to
regulate equity crowdfunding with the goal to help startups raise funding.6
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) implements the JOBS
Act and as part of this regulation, crowdfunding platforms must use the allor-nothing model.7
This model owes its popularity to one major upside as compared to a
2. For a more in depth discussion of crowdfunding, see GARRY A. GABISON, JOINT RESEARCH
CENTRE, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, UNDERSTANDING CROWDFUNDING AND ITS REGULATIONS (2015)
[hereinafter UNDERSTANDING CROWDFUNDING], http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstre
am/JRC92482/lbna26992enn.pdf; Garry A. Gabison, Equity Crowdfunding: All Regulated but Not
Equal, 13 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 359 (2015) [hereinafter Equity Crowdfunding].
3. Contributors to donation based crowdfunding campaigns do not receive anything for their
contributions. Contributors to a reward based crowdfunding campaign receive some good or service in
exchange for their contributions. Contributors to a lending based crowdfunding campaign receive
interest payments in exchange for financing a project. Lending based crowdfunding is a form of microlending, where contributors can select a project with an associated rate of return and maturation date.
Contributors to equity based crowdfunding receive capital equity into a venture in exchange for their
contributions. C. Steven Bradford. Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws. 2012 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 1, 15 (2012).
4. “Funding on Kickstarter is all-or-nothing — projects must reach their funding goals to receive
any money. All-or-nothing funding might seem scary, but it’s amazingly effective in creating
momentum and rallying people around an idea. To date, an impressive 44% of projects have reached
their funding goals.” Seven Things to Know About Kickstarter, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.
com/hello (last visited Aug. 4, 2015).
5. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, H.R. 3606, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (to
be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter JOBS Act].
6. Equity crowdfunding is a form of crowdfunding where the investing crowd receives equity
shares into a company in return for their investments. The JOBS Act intends to “increase American job
creation and economic growth by improving access to the public capital markets for emerging growth
companies.” Id. The SEC “understand[s] that Title III was designed to help alleviate the funding gap
and accompanying regulatory concerns faced by startups and small businesses in connection with
raising capital in relatively low dollar amounts.” Crowdfunding, supra note 1 (quoting the
Congressional debate).
7. “[T]his rule was designed to prevent fraud ‘either upon the person on whose behalf the
distribution is being made or upon the customer to whom the payment is to be returned if the
distribution is not completed.’” Crowdfunding, supra note 1; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-4 (2016)
(“Transmission or Maintenance of Payments Received in Connection with Underwritings”). The rules
require that the offering specifies a minimum amount — the threshold — and may use as well as a
maximum offering.
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model where all funds are disbursed as they are raised (sometimes referred
as a keep-it-all model): it is supposed to limit frauds. The model does not
stop fraud in and of itself; the model relies on individuals to perform their
private-incentive-driven due diligence and catch fraud.8 Some users may
of course free ride upon the due diligence of others. Assuming that enough
investors perform due diligence activities, fraudulent schemes should be
detected; yet, some schemes get through these safety nets. For instance, in
2015, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) settled its first internet
crowdfunding case9 where the fundraising individual never delivered and
used the funds for personal reasons.
Talks are underway in the U.S. Congress to extend the JOBS Act
exemption even further.10 Policymakers may wish to reinvestigate the
reliance on the all-or-nothing model to detect fraud and put in place other
safeguards. Such safeguards can ensure that some crowd members perform
enough due diligence. In Europe, for instance, Italian policymakers
required that “at least 5% of the financial instruments offered are
undersigned by professional investors or by banking foundations or by
innovative start-up incubators.”11
The implicit assumption is that
professional investors have sufficient private incentives to perform their
due diligence because their livelihood depends on it and they also have
sufficient expertise to filter projects. In a sense, Italian regulators may not
trust private individuals to perform due diligence.
In this optic, this paper questions whether the all-or-nothing model
should be trusted on its own. The analysis in this paper is based upon the
idea that if a crowdfunding campaign turns out to be a fraudulent scheme, it
will not be privately efficient to rectify: The cost of privately suing
outweighs the benefits because each individual suffers a small injury but
the litigation costs are large. While the argument often focuses on
fraudulent schemes, it can be extended to projects that cannot (blatantly) be
completed.12
8. “Read what others say. If you’re not sure about something, you can look elsewhere on the
web. Does the creator have an online presence, or past work you can look at? Do people say good
things about them? If you’re curious about the thing they’re creating, you can look into that, too. Has it
been tried before? What happened then?” Trust & Safety, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.
com/trust (last visited Mar. 13, 2016).
9. Rebecca R. Ruiz, F.T.C. Reaches Settlement in a Kickstarter Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, June 12,
2015, at B2.
10. Ruth Simon & Angus Loten, Frustration Rises Over Crowdfunding Rules¸ WALL ST. J. (Apr.
30, 2014, 7:12 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304163604579532251627
028512.
11. CONSOB Regolamento n. 18592/2013, art. 24 (June 26, 2013) (It.).
12. This paper does not argue that all crowdfunding projects must succeed; instead, some projects
are recklessly funded. “Recklessly funded” occurs when a rational individual who perform a reasonable
due diligence would not have invested his own funds into the projects because it reasonably believes or
expects that the project is more likely to fail than succeed.
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This paper first deconstructs the all-or-nothing model from all three
sides: the platform’s incentives to investigate, the campaign creator’s
incentives to provide information, and the crowd’s incentives to invest
optimally. Second, this paper discusses how overfunding encourages
herding which leads to two problems: The investing crowd has little
incentive to check a project; and too few projects get funded. The former
problem is, however, the main concern of this paper. Allowing campaign
creators to overfund hides information from the crowd, and even if the
crowd were fully rational, they would not be able to make an educated
investment. In other words, overfunding combined with the all-or-nothing
model distorts incentives further. Finally, this paper discusses how liability
and regulations have attempted to redress some distorted incentives.
Reward based platforms do not carry much liability; hence, they have little
incentive to filter projects. Increasing liability of campaign creators can
have an impact on their behavior but they may respond more to disclosure
requirements that require them to signal their past performance in order to
approximate their future intent. Finally, to realign the incentives of the
crowd may require platforms and policymakers to work together and
become innovative: Paternalistic regulation such as capping the investment
level may not be sufficient; behavioral economics suggest some ways to
encourage more due diligence.
II. THE ALL-OR-NOTHING MODEL DISTORTS INCENTIVES TO
INVESTIGATE
Crowdfunding involves three participants: the crowdfunding platform,
the campaign creator, and the crowd. This section looks at each participant
and how the all-or-nothing model affects their behavior and may
incentivize these participants to make crowdfunding less socially optimal
than it can be.
A. THE PLATFORM’S INCENTIVE TO INVESTIGATE
Platforms have a private incentive to ensure that they do not attract
bad, failing, and fraudulent products (e.g., pyramid schemes). If they do
not filter for these projects, their reputation and their goodwill would be
harmed. More importantly, their service would become unwanted and the
platform would, itself, fail. Approaches differ greatly from platform to
platform to ensure that they properly filter projects. These approaches can
be divided in two: preemptive due diligence and retroactive actions.
On the one hand, pre-emptive due diligence requires more
participation from the platform because it requires that the platform check
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all projects. Therefore, platforms will use this technique if their service
attracts a large number of problematic projects. The larger cost associated
with performing a due diligence for all projects must also be passed onto
both type of portal users (fundraisers and investors).
Some platforms perform a due diligence and filter campaigns before
posting them on their portal. For instance, WiSeed, a French based equity
crowdfunding platform, performs an initial review, proposes the selected
projects to the crowd to vote along eleven criteria, and finally the platform
performs a due diligence before allowing the crowd to invest.13
This triple-layered filter may not be enough to protect the crowd from
unsuccessful projects.
WiSeed states risk capital such as equity
crowdfunding involves risks by definition and states that out of every ten
companies, investors should expect that three will be written off, two will
break even, and the remaining five may bring back enough capital to lead
to profits.14 Since its creation in 2008, WiSeed has helped finance seventysix companies for almost thirty million euros:15 They recorded, as of mid2015, five negative exits to one positive exit; the rest of the investment
remained un-exited. Even with a three-layer filter,16 the current successful
exit rate is low, much lower than what WiSeed predicts.
Besides protecting their goodwill, certain platforms have aligned their
own private incentives with performing exhaustive due diligences. For
instance, some equity based crowdfunding platforms perform extensive due
diligence because they earn more when projects succeed and the crowd
earns more. Seedrs, a U.K. based equity crowdfunding platform, profits
only if the crowd profits because their fee is linked to the profits that
investors make upon reselling their shares.17 As such, the platform has a
13. GUIDE ENTREPRENEUR, WISEED, https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/wiseed-public-fr/med
iatheque/guide_entrepreneurs.pdf.
14. Christine Lejoux, Wiseed, ou Quand les Particuliers Investissent le Capital-Risque, LA
TRIBUNE (Aug. 1, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/wiseed-ou-quand-les-p
articuliers-investissent-le-capital-risque-495249.html.
15. Startups Funded per Year, WISEED, https://www.wiseed.com/en/startups/equity-crowdfund
ing (last visited Mar. 13, 2016).
16. In 2014, around one thousand companies submitted to WiSEED to start a campaign and from
these thousand, thirteen were financed and with a ninety-four percent success rate. Christelle Lefebvre,
Wiseed: “Un Assouplissement Fiscal Positif Pour les Start-Ups,” NICE MATIN (Jan. 22, 2015, 10:59
AM), http://www.nicematin.com/le-club-eco/wiseed-un-assouplissement-fiscal-positif-pour-les-startups. 2075105.html (“Wiseed voit arriver 1000 projets par an, elle en a financé 13 en 2014 avec un taux
de réussite des souscriptions de 94%.”). In 2014, among these one thousand projects, two hundred
projects were submitted to e-vote and fifty went to due diligence. Wiseed, EDUBANQUE.COM,
http://www.edubanque. com/entreprendre/crowdfunding/annuaire-du-crowdfunding/wiseed.html (last
updated Jan. 6, 2015) (“200 projets passés en e-vote, 50 projets passés en due-diligence”).
17. For instance, Seedrs “only charge[s] a single, straightforward fee of 7.5% on any profit that
you make on an investment held by us as nominee.” Frequently Asked Questions, SEEDRS,
https://learn.seedrs.com/faqs/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2016). Seedrs creates a holding to hold the shares
brought by the crowd and collects the 7.5% when a contributor sells its shares.
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strong incentive to perform preemptive due diligence.
Arguably, some platforms perform so much due diligence that they
provide few incentives for other crowdfunding participant to perform their
own.18 For WiSeed, the filtering may have disincentivized other forms of
due diligence since almost all projects that make it through these filters are
financed;19 hence, the weeding out promised by the all-or-nothing model
may not work after all or even become almost redundant.
Preemptive due diligence is not adequate for all platform types.
Equity crowdfunding platforms can perform this kind of due diligence
because they receive relatively fewer projects.20
Reward based
crowdfunding, however, has opted for a more reactive approach because of
the large volume of projects they receive: checking each project would
require larger costs that would be then passed on to platform users; thus, to
keep cost low, such platforms may prefer not to perform preemptive due
diligence and, instead, may prefer to act after the fact.
Proactive due diligence occurs after the projects have been publically
posted and even received some investments. As such, proactive due
diligence relies on the crowd to flag problematic projects. In other words,
it exploits the all-or-nothing model attributes more than preemptive due
diligence.
For instance, Kickstarter receives thousands of projects and it has
helped to successfully finance over 22,000 projects with success rates
varying between thirty-four percent and seventy percent depending on the
category or industry.21 Kickstarter acts after the crowd flags a project as
problematic.22 In other words, Kickstarter relies on the crowd to perform
its due diligence. Once, a project is flagged, the platform investigates this
problematic project; if the platform's due diligence discovers problems with
18. “The crowd’s decision on whether or not to support a crowdfunding campaign is very much
based on emotion and as such, the time spent by a potential backer in reading the details of a
crowdfunding campaign and subsequently deciding whether or not to contribute is only a matter of a
few minutes. Surprisingly, this also holds true for crowdinvesting.” SPACETEC CAPITAL PARTNERS
GMBH, CROWDFUNDING INNOVATIVE VENTURES IN EUROPE: THE FINANCIAL ECOSYSTEM AND
REGULATORY LANDSCAPE (2014). Behavioral economists have also observed this “intuitive” decisionmaking and investment in other contexts. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality:
Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2003) (discussing the literature on
decision making).
19. See Startups Funded per Year, supra note 15.
20. Also as licensed financial analyst, they have a duty to perform some due diligence, particularly
if they are considered the agent of investors. See, e.g., Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 388.
21. Stephen Heyman, Keeping up with Kickstarter, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.ny
times.com/2015/01/15/arts/international/keeping-up-with-kickstarter.html.
22. For instance, Kickstarter cancelled a crowdfunding campaign that showed potential signs of
fraud during the campaign, after eighty percent of the threshold was already reached. Kickstarter Pulls
Plug on the Rock Smartwatch After Backer Concerns, CROWDSOURCING.ORG (Dec. 11, 2013),
http://www. crowdsourcing.org/editorial/kickstarter-pulls-plug-on-the-rock-smartwatch-after-backercon
cerns/29644.
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the projects, the platform removes the project and refunds the invested
funds.
Preemptive actions take the onus away from the crowd to perform due
diligence, whereas pro-active measures rely on the crowd to play a central
role in filtering out unviable and/or fraudulent schemes. Exploiting the allor-nothing model disincentivizes platforms to perform its own due
diligence on every project, and instead, platforms perform due diligence
only on flagged projects.
Note that even the platforms that perform their own diligence, like
WiSeed, still rely on the crowd. While this reliance may help filter projects
on which the crowd has better information, it may well be more reflective
of filtering projects that some crowd members will not like and support. In
other words, the platform relies on the crowd to filter projects in which
performing due diligence would constitute a waste of resources for
commercial reasons, instead of reasons linked to project inherent defects.
The next section investigates how the all-or-nothing model
incentivizes campaign creators to disclose valuable information.
B. THE CAMPAIGN CREATOR’S INCENTIVES TO DISCLOSE INFORMATION
Campaign creators have an incentive to reveal information because
they want to secure investment. Campaign creators compete with other
campaigners for the crowd's (limited) funds. In order to distinguish their
project from others, they have an incentive to disclose positive information:
they have incentive to signal that they project will succeed.
The all-or-nothing model seems to encourage them to provide even
more details and present the information at a lower reading level23 as
compared to the keep-it-all model.24 Since they need to convince the crowd
to invest beyond a certain threshold, campaign creators are incentivized to
provide more information than under the keep-it-all model. With more
information, the crowd should be able to make better decisions and be able
to detect issues.
More information may not always help investors; instead, higher
quality information should be the focus.25 Campaign creators perform a
23. Douglas J. Cumming et al., Crowdfunding Models: Keep-it-All vs. All-or-Nothing (Working
Paper, May 31, 2015, version) (using data from Indiegogo, which lets the campaign create elects
between a keep-it-all and all-or-nothing model, and finding a correlation between the all-or-nothing
model and more information such as a longer and easier to read project description with more pictures
and video pitches).
24. The keep-it-all model is one where the fundraiser keeps any funds that he or she raises through
the crowdfunding campaign period.
25. Jan Barton & Gregory Waymire, Investor Protection Under Unregulated Financial Reporting,
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cost benefit analysis in order to decide what information to disclose. As
such, a campaign creator will only disclose information that he or she
believes increases the probability of securing financing; and he or she will
hide information that would hurt its chance of success.
Some information, such as an audited financial statements, is
expensive to produce and producing this information does not guarantee
that the campaign will succeed. Nonetheless, it helps campaign creators
send a strong signal about the belief he has in his project.
With crowdfunding, the costs usually outweigh the benefits because
investors are numerous enough that they need not convince every investor,
but only a small portion. Traditional investment mechanisms, such as loans
from banks, or investments from business angel or venture capital
investors, usually involves only a few players; hence, fund-seekers need to
send a strong signal to convince even one of these few players. With
crowdfunding, fund-seekers need only to convince a small fraction of a
large group.
Therefore, campaign creators do not usually disclose costly
information unless prompted.26 While none of the equity crowdfunding
regulations in Europe requires that the campaign creators disclose such
information, the U.S. regulations have a disclosure requirement, which
varies depending on the threshold sought.27 U.S. policymakers have
recognized that the incentives created by the all-or-nothing model were not
sufficient to encourage fundraisers to disclose valuable information.
C. THE CROWD BEARS THE BRUNT OF THE DUE DILIGENCE
Some platforms rely on the crowd to perform its due diligence. Some
have questioned the wisdom of the crowd, stating that it rests upon faulty
assumptions.28 The crowd has generally three options when participating in
crowdfunding: an individual can research a project, generate information,

38 J. ACCT. & ECON. 65, 39 (2004) (empirically finding that companies which reported higher quality
information experience lower smaller losses during the 1929 crash).
26. Barton & Waymire, supra note 25, at 4 (empirically finding “that managers select financial
reporting quality by factoring in investor demand for information”).
27. Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 389.
28. Zachary J. Griffin, Crowdfunding: Fleecing the American Masses, 4 CASE W. RES. J. L. TECH.
& INTERNET 375, 402 (2013) (arguing that the wisdom of the crowd relies on three assumptions:
“1) that someone will uncover fraudulent information in business plans; 2) that those same individuals
will post the ‘truth’ on the Internet; and 3) that crowdfunding investors will see and read the posts about
fraudulent business plans. If any one of these assumptions fails, the whole ‘wisdom of the crowds’
theory collapses.”); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Investor and Market Protection in the Crowdfunding
Era: Disclosing To and For the “Crowd”, 38 VT. L. REV. 827, 847–48 (2014) (discussing the wisdom
and the madness of the crowd and argue that governmental mandated disclosure may be useless
depending on the predominant behaviors of the crowd (decentralized, independent, and diverse)).
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and add to the crowdfunding project experience; or an individual can
consume the information created by others and follow their
recommendations; or an individual can do neither, but still choose between
participating or not.29
The first type of individual is difficult to believe. If an individual
generates information, he must expend time and potentially resources to do
so. After generating that information, he can either keep it to himself or
share it with other members of the crowd. If a crowd participant invests in
a project, he has incentives to promote the project whereas if a crowd
participant believes a project is a fraud (or simply bad), he has little private
incentive to spend more time and resources to flag it as such. In other
words, positive disclosures may be difficult to interpret; negative
disclosures are not as frequent as they should be and when they occur, they
might be motivated by other reasons. In the end, each member of the
crowd may have to rely on their own due diligence, which almost defeats
the idea behind the crowd and the all-or-nothing model.
For the crowd to function as a project filter, the same individual needs
to promote good projects and detract bad projects in order for their signal to
become trustworthy; otherwise, the information produced may be difficult
to trust and to distinguish from noise. Arguably, other mechanisms
incentivize information sharing in this setting. For instance, an individual
can be rewarded for sharing his knowledge about a bad project through
enhanced reputation.
One study finds that if individuals have private incentives to promote
a campaign, they may encourage riskier projects.30 They found that some
crowd members may strategically invest in order to induce others to invest
because investing seems to be the clearest endorsement message. In other
words, it should not be surprising that if a campaign is a fraud, crowd
members participating in the scheme might induce others to invest.
The second type of individual may misinterpret the important
information. If an individual consumes information, he expends fewer
resources. Even if all the information is valuable, the marginal benefit of
consuming additional information decreases; hence, the consumers may
focus on the most obvious information without digging deep.31
29. See, e.g., Ilan Kremer et al., Implementing the “Wisdom of the Crowd,” 122 J. POL. ECON. 988
(2014) (providing a modelization of the interaction of three participation options).
30. Thomas Hildebrand et al., Adverse Incentives in Crowdfunding (Working Paper, Feb. 20,
2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1615483 (finding that in loan-based crowdfunding, rewards have
created adverse incentives for group leaders to promote risky loans with higher default rates while other
crowd members are not aware of this incentive and follow the leader in their investment).
31. See, e.g., Scott Counts & Kristie Fisher, Taking it All in? Visual Attention in Microblog
Consumption, 11 INT’L AAAI CONF. ON WEBLOGS & SOC. MEDIA 97 (2011) (discussing the limited
attention of consumers and the information characteristics that trigger consumers’ actions).
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Furthermore, the consumers may struggle to seperate valuable information
from noise; hence, they may struggle to decide in which project to invest to
maximize their welfare.
One study found that initial investors are usually the ones in
geographical proximity of a project, i.e., they are able to physically verify
the project.32 Considering that location does not affect the information
consumption costs, the underlying conclusion is that information
consumers (i.e., follow-up investors) base their investment decisions on the
judgment of investors who are closely located to the project creator.33
Since investing is the strongest message, and location permits better fraud
detection, information consumers wait for people who can observe the
campaign creator to invest before investing themselves.
However, trusting people based on their physical closeness to the
individual fundraising can be problematic because those same people
maybe the ones promoting a bad or fraudulent scheme. Family and friends,
who might provide the seed money for a crowdfunding campaign, may
strategically bid and endorse a project or endorse a project for other reasons
other than their own benefits.34
The third type of individual may misguide other investors. If an
individual does not produce or consume information, he expends no
resources. Instead, he or she invests based on “hunches” and the
information provided to him by the campaign creator or platform.35
Relying on hunches is an option with crowdfunding because he or she may
invest small amounts and diversify his or her risks such that it may not be
either privately optimal to generate or consume information. Investors may
not even learn from their mistake since most do not repeatedly invest over a
year.36
32. Ajay Agrawal et al., Offline Relationships, Distance, and the Internet: The Geography of
Crowdfunding (Working Paper, Mar. 10, 2011), http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~atakos/ResearchCamp/
agoldfarbpaper.pdf.
33. See id.
34. Family and friends may consider the wellbeing of the fundraiser when they assess their own
benefits. For instance, a parent may invest into the project of a child not because they believe that their
invest will turn into profits but because their child receives a head start that can help them accomplish
their ultimate goal and happiness: parent’s wellbeing is dependent on their child’s wellbeing.
35. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
36. See The Best of 2012, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/year/2012 (last visited Mar.
13, 2016) (claiming that of its 2.2 million people who backed projects in 2012, only 570,672 backed
two or more); 13: The Year in Kickstarter, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/year/2013 (last
visited Mar. 13, 2016) (claiming that in 2013 Kickstarter had three million people pledge, of which
“807,733 backed more than one project.”); The Year in Kickstarter 2014, KICKSTARTER BLOG,
https://www.kickstarter.com/year/2014 (last visited Mar. 13, 2016) (claiming that in 2014, 3.3 million
people backed a Kickstarter project, of which “773,824 people backed more than one project”). Hence
about 74% of backers back only one project in 2012, seventy-one percent in 2013, and seventy-seven
percent in 2014. These numbers do not account for individuals who come back from year to year and
who may be learning by doing; but it also highlights that the majority of individuals are attracted to
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This investor type is problematic because by investing, they are
generating information for subsequent investors.37 Since information
consumers may not wish to rely on this cheap talk provided by information
generators, they may focus their attention on the number of committed
investors and the commitment level. Since the last kind of investors invest
without due diligence,38 they can induce others to invest without filtering
projects through other means.
The crowd will be composed of all three types of individuals. If
noninformation generators and consumer investors dominate the crowd,
free riding becomes problematic.39 These investor types rely on other
investors’ private incentives to perform due diligence and check the project
in depth.
The all-or-nothing model can disturb the order between information
gatherers and consumers. In this model, even if non-information generator
and consumer investors are the first to invest, they can free ride on future
actions. These investor types know that in order to be funded, a project
needs to gather a critical mass in order for the funds to be disbursed; hence,
they may invest under the assumption that later investors will perform their
due diligence and sufficient investors will perform such analysis within the

specific projects.
37. Empirical studies have found that the amount invested provides incentive for others to invest
whereas the number of investors may provide a disincentive to invest. Professors Juanjuan Zhang and
Peng Liu also found that crowd-lender in an all-or-nothing model take in consideration the investment
behavior of previous investors before investing: investors are more likely to bid if they observe that the
amount invested is larger and the percent left to reach the threshold is smaller; however, the higher the
number of investors observed the less likelihood individuals are to invest because “as decision-makers
imitate their predecessors, their own choices become less diagnostic of quality.” Juanjuan Zhang &
Peng Liu, Rational Herding in Microloan Markets, 58 MGMT. SCI. 892 (2012). In Crowdfunding
Creative Ideas: The Dynamics of Project Backers in Kickstarter, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2234765 (2014), Venkat Kuppuswamy & Barry L. Bayus performed a similar
analysis. They focused on the number of investors. They found that the ratio of the cumulative number
of backers supporting a project to the total number of backers required to reach project’s goal impacts
the likelihood of receiving new investments. In reward based crowdfunding, the daily additional
average number of investors does not linearly increase over time; instead, it follows a “U” shape: it
decreases at first to increase in the later stages of the campaign; once fully funded, this number slowly
decreases again.
38. See Wenjing Duan et al., Informational Cascades and Software Adoption on the Internet: An
Empirical Investigation, 33 MISS. Q. 23 (2009) (finding that online communities can exhibit this
behavior where the crowd follows the behavior the adoption decision of predecessor without actively
consuming and processing information to make that decision and that crowds when adopting software
follow the cascade theory: User reviews have no impact on the adoption of popular product whereas
they have an impact on less popular product).
39. Hendrik Hakenes & Friederike Schlegel, Exploiting the Financial Wisdom of the Crowd —
Crowdfunding as a Tool to Aggregate Vague Information (Working Paper, Aug. 1, 2014 version),
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2475025 (modeling the crowdfunding investment mechanism in a loanbased crowdfunding setting and shows that some investors have no incentive to gather information in an
all-or-nothing model and instead “may still want to make a pledge, trying to free-ride on the
information provided by the informed households”).
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required critical mass.40 In the process, they generate information for
subsequent investors as well.
In general, the all-or-nothing model leads to only a few individuals
carrying out some form of due diligence and too much free riding. Without
a critical mass performing due diligence, the all-or-nothing crowdfunding
model fails to ensure that the crowd will not lose their investment through
fraud or bad projects.
The lack of due diligence is exacerbated in the equity all-or-nothing
model because investors will rely on the platforms to perform their own
due diligence  particularly if the platform's fee is attached to investment
performance. In other words, the all-or-nothing model may encourage the
crowd not to be wise, but instead to follow each other.
To counter some of these issues, the Italian regulations have required
that at least five percent of the invested funds come from sophisticated
investors. The logic being that at least five percent of the investment will
come from individuals who will perform a due diligence: Sophisticated
investors have the expertise to understand business planning. They make a
living out of investing; hence, they have a strong private incentive to
perform due diligence.
This logic, however, may not function and these sophisticated
investors may not provide this safety net. Nonprofessionals may invest
based upon the knowledge that professional investors will perform their
due diligence:41 they rely, once more, on the necessary critical mass of the
all-or-nothing model. In other words, this rule may induce even more
investment than without it.
Sophisticated investors may also take more risk than they would
otherwise because of the small relative amount invested and their capacity
to diversify.
For instance, in 2014, Stars Up, an Italian based
crowdfunding platform, helped raise funds for its first project, Cantiere
Savona, a start-up that produces solar-motor boats.42 It raised €380,000
from forty-four investors or about €8,600 per investor; however, it took
eight business days between reaching the fund threshold and achieving the
requisite five-percent-from-professional-investor threshold.43
In this

40. “[T]he sequential nature of investment has the potential of triggering an information cascade.
This path dependence suggests that funding success will only reflect underlying project quality if early
funders do a careful job screening projects.” Ajay Agrawal et al., Some Simple Economics of
Crowdfunding, in INNOVATION POL’Y & THE ECON. 63 (Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 14th ed. 2014).
41. Crowdfunding opened investing to potential investors without the same kind of expertise.
Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 386–99 (discussing in more details the different definition of a
sophisticated investors and the different relaxation of this rule in the U.K., the U.S., France, and Italy).
42. See Cantiere Savona SRL, STARSUP, http://www.starsup.it/project/cantiere-savona-srl/ (last
visited Mar. 13, 2016).
43. Observation made from checking the website regularly.
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example, the sophisticated investors were the last to invest; hence, they did
not generate information for others and instead just approved a project
ready to launch.
Finally, the previous discussion assumes that investors are generally
fully rational; however, behavioral economic studies have shown that
investors do not always behave entirely rationally.44 They may suffer from
overconfidence when they put too much stock in the information they
derived.45 One such issue can arise when crowd members see other
investors with private information about the project invest and fail to
realize that other reasons besides profit making (e.g., love) can lead to
investing. Crowd investors could believe that other individuals have better
information than they do and crowd investors could over rely on the
crowd's investment behavior more than they really should.
Overfunding can also induce even more overconfidence: crowd
investor can interpret overfunding to mean that a project is more successful
than the fundraiser believed it would be. Overfunding can aggravate some
of the all-or-nothing model flaws. The next section investigates in more
details overfunding within the context of the all-or-nothing model.
III. OVERFUNDING ENCOURAGES HERDING AND FURTHER
DISTORTS INCENTIVES
Overfunding occurs when a campaign creator allows the crowd to
invest beyond the preset threshold and the crowd keeps investing.
Overfunding frequently occurs.
In the reward-based setting, one study found that in over 40,000
Kickstarter projects created between 2009 and July 2012, the projects that
were successfully funded were also on average funded at 152% of their

44. Behavioral economics has showed that investment behavior may suffer from a number of
belief distortions. Nicholas Barberis & Richard Thaler, A Survey of Behavioral Finance, in Handbook
of the Economics of Fin. (G.M. Constantinides et al., eds. 2003) http://faculty.som.yale.edu/nichola
sbarberis/ch18_6.pdf (suggesting overconfidence, optimism and wishful thinking, representatives,
conservatism, belief perseverance, anchoring, and availability biases as potential belief disruptors that
can affect investor decisions); at 1064 (stating that optimism and wishful thinking occurs when
investors overestimate their investment abilities); (representativeness occurs when investors misidentify
characteristics and associations and investors make generalization); at 1065 (conservatism occurs when
investors underestimate the occurrence of a hypothesis based on an observed event); at 1066 (belief
perseverance occurs when investors cling on too long to a belief); (anchoring occurs when an investor’s
initial belief affects future belief); (availability biases occur when investor's more recent experiences
overly affect his belief).
45. Overconfidence occurs when investors “believe that they have information strong enough to
justify a trade, whereas in fact the information is too weak to warrant any action.” 2 ADVANCES IN
BEHAVIORAL FIN. 53 (Richard H. Thaler ed., 2005).

502

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 12:3

threshold goals, overfunded by 51.9%.46
In the equity based setting, from data collected on CrowdCube,
successful equity crowdfunding campaigns in 2014, were funded at 140%
of the target threshold.47
Allowing overfunding creates a two-fold problem when deployed with
the all-or-nothing model. This section investigates the issues that
overfunding creates for the crowd and how campaign creators can take
advantage of overfunding.
A. THE CROWD HAS A LOWER INCENTIVE TO INVESTIGATE
Investors incorporate in their decision making process the number of
previous investors, the level of investments made, and remaining
investments needed to reach the threshold. Empirical studies have found
that the ratio of investments made to the goal, strongly influences the
decision process of investors.48 Furthermore, observing overfunding tends
to trigger even more funding than underfunding.49
Subsequent investors take into consideration the funding level for two
reasons. First, they trust that the critical mass that came before them has
performed their due diligence before investing. Overfunding discourages
information gathering. Crowd members who are uninformed and unwilling
to inform themselves herd around projects that have already garnered
enough support.50 Second, they are assured that the project will become
funded; hence, investing in overfunded projects removes any lingering
doubt about the project's outcome and spares the investors the search cost
of looking for an alternative investment.
Herding is privately efficient, but it creates problems. First, herding
around a few projects leaves fewer resources for other projects, which may
remain unfunded. Therefore, overfunding furthers inequality between
projects and project creators.51
46. Ethan Mollick, The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study, 29 J. BUS. VENTURING
1, tbl. 1 (2014).
47. Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 407 Table 5.
48. See Zhang & Liu, supra note 37.
49. Lars Hornuf & Armin Schwienbacher, Funding Dynamics in Crowdinvesting (Working Paper,
2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2612998 (testing the effect of overfunding on the investment incentive
in crowd-investment in Germany and finding that “[c]ompared to pre-funding, the number of
investments is 2.23 percent larger in the postfunding period”).
50. Agrawal et al., supra note 32 (stating that “[f]unding propensity increases with accumulated
capital and may lead to herding.”). In Herding and Contrarian Behavior in Financial Markets, 79
ECONOMETRICA 973 (2011), Andreas Park & Hamid Sabourian model sequential investment model and
describe the circumstances under which investors herding.
51. Initial investments usually come from friends and family. Since the projects that reach their
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Second, overfunding takes the project control away from the
campaign creator. For reward based crowdfunding, one study found that
overfunded projects are more likely to experience delayed deliveries.52
Delays with overfunding can be explained in two ways. First, the project
funder allowed for overfunding and did not accurately anticipate the
demand; hence, since the realized demand exceeds the expected supply, the
delivery takes longer than expected. Second, overfunding encourages
campaign creators to ex-ante ask for less than they need. If they cannot
reach sufficient economies of scale to fulfill the demand, then they may
need to find complementary funds whose search delays the project and
increases the cost.53
B. CAMPAIGN CREATORS MISINFORMATION STRATEGY
Campaign creators can game the system to induce more investment.
Instead of selecting the level of investment they want, they can set their
threshold lower. Specifically, campaign creators have a private incentive
to select an amount they believe can be collected easily, which then will
further induce uneducated investors to follow others.
In other words, the campaign creator may distort the information
provided by the would-be investment level: investors cannot trust how
much a company requests under overfunding. This creates two problems.
First, empirical studies show that investors are not only affected by the
percentage of the goal reached but also by the actual amount required.54
Since the campaign creator under-asks for funds to assure that he reaches
the threshold and encourages further funding through overfunding, he may
end up with less than he needs to succeed. Collecting less than he needs
increases his chances of failure. Alternatively, he may elect to complement
the initial crowdfunding campaign.

He can complement his campaign by a loan or a subsequent
campaign.55 For reward-based campaigns, seeking a loan or a subsequent
goal garner more interest, the seed funds from friends and family will perpetuate the initial inequality of
project creators: project creators who come from poor background will have poorer friends and family
who may not be able to put the seed money sufficient to garner other individual attention; instead, few
projects herd these funds that are not linked to a project.
52. Mollick, supra note 46, at 12–13.
53. In traditional market, a high demand implies that the company can charge higher prices for the
product to the point that supply meets demand; instead, in crowdfunding with overfunding, the whole
demand is affected and, since the prices are set, the cost is carried by the campaign creator, who ends up
losing money.
54. See Zhang & Liu, supra note 37.
55. Ethan R. Mollick & Venkat Kuppuswamy, After the Campaign: Outcomes of Crowdfunding
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campaign can retard the delivery of goods for the initial reward based
campaign.
In the equity context, overfunding does not allow investors to form an
accurate belief. Loans decrease the future earning potential of the initial
investment because the fundraiser will have to repay the interest whereas
the initial funds raised were provided interest free. A subsequent campaign
can further put investors at risk56 because it can dilute the investors'
shares.57 Under certain regulations, like in the U.S., crowd investors are
locked into their investment for 12 months and may not be able to avoid
dilution by reselling their investment or by negotiating antidilution
clauses.58
Finally, in equity crowdfunding, the crowd cannot accurately
anticipate the level of the agency problem59 because overfunding creates
uncertainties and, hence, unclear rules. While the agency problem cannot
be avoided,60 potential investors cannot estimate the campaign creator’s
remaining level of incentive.61
Overfunding compounds the information asymmetries of investing
into new companies or new projects. When an investor considers making a
contribution, he or she forms beliefs about the projects. Since investors
(UNC Kenan-Flagler Research, Paper No. 2376997, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2376997 (finding that the majority of campaign creator in Kickstarter sample ended up
complementing their campaign by raising further funds from other sources including from following up
campaign).
56. Edmund W. Kitch compares investing in securities regulation to gambling and calls for the
government to become consistent about its regulations: “If governments are . . . fine . . . [with] citizen
. . . gambling, does it make sense to try to prevent them from investing . . . and assuming the risk that
their investment is an unprofitable one? Application of the securities acts needs to adapt to modern
technologies and contemporary views.” Edmund W. Kitch, Crowdfunding and an Innovator’s Access
to Capital, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 887, 889 (2014).
57. See, e.g., John S. Wroldsen, The Social Network and the Crowdfund Act: Zuckerberg, Saverin,
and Venture Capitalists’ Dilution of the Crowd, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 583, 618 (2013)
(discussion the issues of dilution as it relates to crowdfunding and arguing that “crowdfunders, like
venture capitalists, need down-round antidilution protection against the horizontal risks that subsequent
investors represent” and “need standard contractual protection against shares-based dilution”).
58. If crowdfunding works, as intended, at providing seed fund to start-ups, then investors should
expect some dilution; but, contrary to traditional investors, like business angels or venture capital funds,
crowd investors may not be able to negotiate for antidilution clauses. Id.
59. The agency problem occurs because the manager/founder of the company does not receive the
whole benefits of his work. Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and
Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 301 (1983) (discussing the issues associated with separating control, which
makes the decision, from ownership, which bears the consequences of decisions because transaction
costs lead to incomplete contracts).
60. It can, however, be addressed by realigning the incentive of the founders with the investors.
For instance, the founder may receive performance incentives (i.e., his salary may be attached to the
companies' returns).
61. For instance, the campaign creator can offer twenty percent of the company to the crowd for
$500,000  the original threshold, but also set an overfunding threshold of forty percent of the
company for $1,000,000 (assuming no dilution). If the founder holds eighty percent or sixty percent of
the company, he has a different incentive to work at the margin.
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may not have access to facts such as whether overfunding is possible and
its level, their beliefs will become inaccurate. Overfunding is not an option
in traditional Initial Public Offerings (“IPOs”).
In general, overfunding places the risk of underfunding on the
committed investors, whereas, without overfunding the risk is on the
campaign creator. Without overfunding, campaign creators may end up
being more forthcoming about what they need. They still have an incentive
to set the threshold to what they think they can reach, but since they know
that over-funding is not possible, these thresholds ought to be more
reflective of what they need.
This is not to say that overfunding should not be allowed, because it
serves a purpose. For instance, in Italy, the regulations allows investors to
change their mind until the threshold is reached within limits;62 some level
of overfunding may be necessary to protect ventures and entrepreneurs
from investor indecisiveness.
Overfunding should, however, be capped, and more importantly be
fully disclosed. The amounts (capitalization, amount, etc.) they disclose
are important information. Without disclosure, investors will be misled.
Alternatively, a way to shift the risk back on the campaign creator is
to allow a cool-off period for investors: a period after the closing of the
fundraising but before they are bound by their commitment.63 Unlike an
IPO, equity crowdfunding allows for overfunding. Investors should be able
to change their mind if they think that the entrepreneurs will keep ninety
percent of the equity but because of overfunding, it gets reduced to eighty
percent.64
IV. REALIGNING INCENTIVES
The all-or-nothing model has drawbacks. The level of due diligence is
arguably less than optimal. Participants have diverging incentives to seek
or hide information. This section examines how these crowdfunding
participants can be encouraged to realign their private incentives with the
optimal level of due diligence.

62. Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 391.
63. For instance the Italian regulation allows investors to withdraw their order within seven days of
ordering or within seven days of having knowledge of a material mistake that would “influence the
decision on the investment.” CONSOB Regolamento n. 18592/2013, art. 13 § 5 & 25 § 2 (June 26,
2013) (It.). Overfunding could constitute such material mistake.
64. The same argument could be made for reward crowdfunding: letting overfunding occur can
change the delivery delay (because of miss-calibration) and hence the crowds desire to participate.
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A. ONLY SOME PLATFORMS ARE HELD LEGALLY LIABLE
Crowdfunding portals have private incentives to filter bad and
fraudulent projects.
Crowdfunding platforms can also be further
incentivized to filter projects by holding them vicariously liable for the
misconduct their platforms enable. Little jurisprudence exists specific to
crowdfunding. As such, this section looks at platform liability in other
context and draws comparisons.
Crowdfunding is a nascent phenomenon and courts have not ruled on
their liability, but they offer similar services as eBay with auctioned goods,
Napster with music files, Airbnb with vacation rentals, and even Uber with
transportation. These other platforms offer a glimpse into platform
liabilities that can help guide crowdfunding platforms. First, this section
looks at reward-based crowdfunding and second it looks at equity-based
crowdfunding.
1. Reward Based Crowdfunding
In most cases, reward based crowdfunding platforms should not be
held liable because crowdfunding platforms only offer a forum where
campaign creators meet the crowd. They do not endorse any actions or
messages they enable through their forum. They do not make product
guarantees nor do they advise the crowd on which project to fund. They
allow the two sides to transact.
eBay is a platform where individuals can “display” and sell their
unwanted goods to other platform users. eBay was one of the first to
litigate this issue of platform liability in the internet context.65 In Gentry v.
eBay,66 the plaintiff purchased memorabilia through eBay.
The
memorabilia turned out to be fake and the plaintiff sued eBay alleging that
eBay was in breach of the California’s Autographed Sports Memorabilia
Statute67 and engaged in unfair business practices under the Unfair
Competition Law.68 The court ruled that eBay is not a sports memorabilia
dealer because it does not control how goods are classified and described
and hence the California's Autographed Sports Memorabilia Statute does
not apply.69 Furthermore, the appellate court also held that Section 230 of

65. For instance, Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 105 (2nd Cir. 2010) discusses that this
Court was the first to apply contributory trademark infringement to an online marketplace and discusses
cases overseas.
66. Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 4th 816 (2002).
67. Cal. Civ. Code § 1739.7 (West 2000).
68. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200-17210.
69. Gentry, 99 Cal. App. 4th at 826–28.
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Title 47 of the United States Code immunizes eBay because the content of
the description was provided by the seller  a third party to eBay  and
thus eBay did not directly publish the information and hence did not cause
the harm70  which barred the Unfair Competition Law claim as well.71
As eBay's success continued to grow, it continued to tract the sale of
counterfeits. In Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc.,72 the court describes the proactive and retroactive measures that eBay has put in place to filter out
counterfeits. Tiffany jewelers alleged that eBay infringed its trademark,73
that eBay contributed its trademark infringement,74 and that eBay was
willfully blind and was not incentivized to filter out counterfeits,75 among
others allegations. The Second Circuit Court dismissed all three claims
against eBay citing eBay’s effort to filter counterfeits ex-ante and ex-post
auction. The Court’s discussion focuses on the difference between eBay's
general knowledge of fraudulent activity and specific knowledge76: General
knowledge is not sufficient to hold the platform liable; instead, they must
have specific knowledge and have failed to act.
Beyond the exchange of tangible goods, other forums have facilitated
the exchange of intangible goods. Napster did for copyrighted materials
what eBay did for counterfeit products: They allowed peer-to-peer
exchange of products. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on a Napster like
application in 2005 in the case of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd.77 In this case, the Court ruled that a peer-to-peer software
designer was liable for enabling and encouraging the transfer of
copyrighted material.78 The Court distinguished this case from the previous
landmark ruling in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.79
because even though both technologies allowed for the infringement of
copyrighted material, Grokster made infringement the objective of the
technology, which could be demonstrated through statements.80 Since this
decision, legal applications of these principles have seen platforms like
YouTube81 evade liability because they performed ex-post enforcement
when copyrighted media was flagged as infringing.
These two examples show that some crowdfunding portals will be
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 828–30.
Id. at 835–36.
Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 600 F.3d at 93.
Id. at 101–03.
Id. at 103–09.
Id. at 109–10
Id. at 107.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
Id. at 940.
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., 545 U.S. at 941.
Viacom Intern. Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 110 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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able to avoid liability. First, most reward based platforms amount to a
presale: the project creators sell products that do not exist yet and promise
to send them in the future. Therefore, such platforms can avoid liability for
the information posted by campaign creators. Second, if the platforms expost ban fraudulent projects after the crowd polices and flags a project, then
they can avoid liability under certain circumstances. Reward based
platforms like Kickstarter that perform ex-post enforcement and rely on the
crowd to monitor projects may well be doing just enough to avoid
liability.82
In the discussed cases, the courts were not swayed by the level of
fraud, but simply by the platforms' actions.83 In the past, Kickstarter has
witnessed even lower levels of fraud.84 While not a factor for courts,
Kickstarter will unlikely face liability because it has put in place sufficient
filters to either deter or fight frauds.
2. Equity Crowdfunding
Platforms can face different problems if they facilitate the exchange of
regulated products or services. Some platforms have come under heavy
criticism because they facilitate peer-to-peer transactions in heavily
regulated industries and step on the toes of brick and mortar regulated
businesses. Equity crowdfunding platforms also facilitate the trading of
regulated products and looking at court decisions in other contexts may
help draw a comparison.
First, Airbnb85 acts as a forum that enables peer-to-peer property
rentals for short or long-term stays. In the case of Airbnb, housing rentals
must comply with various zoning laws, tax regulations, and other local

82. Kickstarter denies liability for fraud or bad performing schemes. Trust and Safety,
KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/trust (explaining Kickstarter’s policy and level of
availability, and what actions it takes in case of complaints). Kickstarter Transparency Report 2014,
KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/blog/kickstarter-transparency-report-2014 (explaining the
actions taken in consequence to complaint about intellectual property right infringements).
83. Andrés Guadamuz González claims “four out of every ten buyers reporting that they have had
some sort of problem with their transactions.” Andrés Guadamuz González, eBay Law: The Legal
Implications of the C2C Electronic Commerce Model, 19 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 468, 469
(2003). In Tiffany (NJ) Inc. the defendant claims that over seventy-three percent of alleged Tiffany
products are counterfeit. 600 F.3d at 99. In Grokster, Justice Breyer cites that ninety percent of the
Grokster traffic may involve copyright infringement issues and the same could be said in Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); yet, the defendant in the former was held
liable while in the latter, it was not. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 951. These examples show that the level of
fraudulent activities is not the issue; the issue revolves around the actions undertaken to stop the frauds.
84. In a sample of 381 Kickstarter products, three issued refunds and eleven stopped responding to
backers: 3.6% of the projects were incomplete. Mollick Ethan Mollick, The Dynamics of
Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study, 29 J. BUS. VENTURING 1, 11 (2014).
85. AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2016).
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ordinances. Their enforcement has been directed toward platform users
and not the platform itself. For instance, in San Francisco, the local
authorities have legislated the duration during which a property can be
rented;86 while it indirectly affects Airbnb, the local ordinance does not
regulate the platform itself. In New York, the authorities have been trying
to clamp down on the hotel tax evasion that Airbnb enables.87 Airbnb itself
has not been held liable either and instead the platform makes sure to
inform users that it does not hold liability.88
Second, Uber89 is a platform enabling the peer-to-peer transport of
individuals. Uber has not been as successful as Airbnb90 at deflecting
liability. Uber is being challenged by the drivers using the platform to
prove that they are not independent contractors, but instead they were
employees of Uber.91 As such, Uber would be vicariously liable for the
actions of the platform users.92
These two examples of peer-to-peer interactions involving regulated
services demonstrate that liability depends on old regulations applied to
new market places. In the equity context, the sale of equity shares is
heavily regulated. Contrary to other previously discussed platforms, U.S.
regulators have carved specific rules for equity crowdfunding platforms
and hold platforms liable for checking into the campaign creator's
background, etc.93
These rules will likely function in the digital world as they do in the
86. Katy Steinmetz, San Francisco Revamps Airbnb Regulations, TIME (July 15, 2015), http://ti
me.com/3958153/san-francisco-airbnb-legislation/.
87. Airbnb, Inc. v. Schneiderman, 44 Misc. 3d 351 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014) (denying a motion to
squash a state general attorney subpoena order against Airbnb where the attorney general attempts to
obtain information about Airbnb users in an attempt to enforce the Multiple Dwelling Laws).
88. See, e.g., Brittany McNamara, Airbnb: A Not-So-Safe Resting Place, 13 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 149 (2015) (discussing the various disclaimers and the lack of liability for Airbnb and stating
that Airbnb avoids liability under § 230).
89. UBER, https://www.uber.com/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2016).
90. Talia G. Loucks, Travelers Beware: Tort Liability in the Sharing Economy, 10 WASH. J.L.
TECH. & ARTS 329, 335 (2014) (arguing that Airbnb avoid liability by behaving like a travel agent).
91. In O'Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., platform users have brought a class action against
Uber because Uber failed to pass on the gratuity that they were allegedly supposed to receive. No. C13-3826 EMC (N.D. Cal. 2015). Uber argues the drivers are not its employees but instead are
independent contractors and therefore not entitled to guarantees that employees receive in California.
The District Court ruled that Uber's drivers are its presumptive employees but questions of facts remain
to be determined as to whether they are employees. Uber faces similar claims and class action for
platform users from Massachusetts and Illinois respectively in Yucesoy v. Uber Technologuies, Inc., No.
4:15-cv-00262-EMC (N.D. Cal. 2015) and Ehret v. Uber, Technologies, Inc., No. 14-cv-0113-EMC
(N.D. Cal. 2015). Some have expressed doubt about the validity of this argument. See e.g., Brishen
Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 82, 98–99 (2015) (stating that the
author is “skeptical, though, that many courts will find Uber drivers to be employees” because most
federal and state statutes require the employer to have “the right to control” and Uber fails to control the
drivers' working hours).
92. Search v. Uber Technologies, Inc., Civil No. 15-257 (JEB) (DDC 2015).
93. Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 389.
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analog world. Equity crowdfunding platforms act as IPO underwriters
because they publish the information necessary to sell shares publicly.
Underwriting a public offering exposes the underwriter to strict liability,
but allegedly liable underwriters can invoke a due diligence defense if
sued.94 Therefore, equity platforms are likely to follow the same rules95 
regardless of their online existence  and Section 230 will not immunize
equity crowdfunding platforms if the campaign creator posts misleading
statements.
3. Realigning Incentives
Not all forms of crowdfunding are equal and as such, realigning
incentives depends upon the nature of the platforms. The platforms'
incentives are the least misaligned of the three crowdfunding participants.
For reward based crowdfunding, it remains too early to say whether
reward crowdfunding projects will involve the same level of fraud as
eBay96 and therefore even require realigning platform incentives to
optimally filter projects. Even if reward crowdfunding platforms do not
filter projects ex-ante, not filtering them ex-post exposes them to enough
liability to incentivize them to perform some due diligence according to the
existing negligence standards discussed above in other platform contexts.
For equity based crowdfunding, platforms have sufficient private and
legal incentives to assure that they filter projects; they sometimes have too
much incentive to filter projects.97 Fraud may not be the biggest threat to
crowdfunding; it may be project creators’ incompetence. Platforms face no
liability if the information disclosed is not misleading, but the projects they
post on their website fail due to project creator’s incompetence. With new
companies, seventy percent of startups fail within five years of their
creation.98 The example of WiSeed in France tends to show that
crowdfunded equity projects fail at a similar or higher rate.99 Professional
investors would know this but the crowd may not and hence they could be
94. The 1933 Act states that “no person, other than the issuer, shall be liable” unless the issuer can
prove that “he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe” at the time of the
statements that they were true without material fact omissions or misleading statements. 15 U.S.C. §
77k(b)(3)(A); Joseph Kieran Leahy, The Irrepressible Myths of BarChris, 37 DJCL 411, 421–25 (2012)
(describing the underwriter's liability and what underwriters have done in order to avoid such liability
and satisfy due diligence).
95. To further protect investors, France regulators have required that these platforms have a civil
insurance in order to be able to pay if they are held liable. Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 396.
96. See supra notes 69–70.
97. See infra Section IV.C.
98. Garry A. Gabison, Birth, Survival, Growth, and Death of ICT Companies, JRC SCIENTIFIC &
POL’Y REPORT, EUR Rep 27127 (2015).
99. Lejoux, supra note 14.
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exposed to risks they do not appreciate.
Platforms as underwriter100 play an important role but they may be
doing too little to assure that equity crowdfunding will not fail.
Crowdfunding platforms could be incentivized to filter projects for
incompetence through liability (using a gross negligence standard for
instance)101 which would lead to a minimum amount of filtering. Such
liability could, however, carry a heavy price: Platforms will end up filtering
projects the same way as other professional investors do and lose some of
the unseen benefits of having the crowd involved who can select and
support projects that traditional investors do not find viable.
B. EQUITY FUNDRAISERS SHOULD DISCLOSE PAST PERFORMANCE 
WITHIN LIMITS
In the online world, peer-to-peer trust relies on reputation based on
feedback from repeated interactions.102 Following each interaction, peers
rate others peer contributions and with each interaction, peers gain status.103
Reputation on a given website may take the form of ratings. In the
crowdfunding context, campaign creators rarely repeatedly interact with
investors like an eBay seller would with purchasers.104 As such, these
ratings have not yet surfaced in the crowdfunding context.105 Relying on
informal means of enforcement may not work in the crowdfunding context.
Campaign creators are legally liable for the information they disclose
on a website. If they intend to defraud platform users, realigning their
incentive requires increasing the enforcement level. The enforcement level
100. Blakley C. Davis and Justin W. Webb argue that the “relationships with underwriters and/or
strategic alliances with established firms can also reduce the liabilities stemming from newness by
enabling the venture to essentially borrow legitimacy from the external party.” Blakley C. Davis &
Justin W. Webb, Crowd-Funding of Entrepreneurial Ventures: Getting the Right Combination of
Signals, 32 FRONTIERS ENTREPRENEURSHIP RES. 1, 5 (2012). Javier Ramos, Crowdfunding and the
Role of Managers in Ensuring the Sustainability of Crowdfunding Platforms, JRC SCIENTIFIC & POL’Y
REPORT 46 (2014) (discussing the role that platform managers can play to prevent fraud).
101. Unlike Uber, who may face liability for negligent hiring, platforms do not face liability for
negligent posting and do not filter projects for incompetence. A similar standard could be applied to
equity crowdfunding.
102. Dara Chevlin, Schemes and Scams: Auction Fraud and the Culpability of Host Auction Web
Sites, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 223, 230 (2005) (discussing the importance of feedback about
online participant but warns that this feedback is not always reliable).
103. Gentry, 99 Cal. App. 4th at 835 (discussing the rating of platform users and finding that
platforms are not liable for the rating because they are highly subjective).
104. For instance, Kickstarter states that twelve percent of campaign creators have launched more
than one project; leaving eighty-eight percent without repeat interactions. KICKSTARTER, https://www.
kickstarter.com/blog/by-the-numbers-when-creators-return-to-kickstarter (last visited Oct. 27, 2015).
105. Note that if platforms create a rating for campaign creators, they are opening themselves up to
liabilities under Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1969) because it could amount to an
endorsement (to be distinguished from Yanase v. Automobile Club of So. Cal., 212 Cal. App. 3d 468
(1989), where such endorsement was not offered).
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depends on the monitoring, prosecution, and damage levels. Damages
include punitive damages and civil and criminal penalties. If defrauding
campaign creators are held to a higher degree, their actions will be better
deterred, however, campaign creators who intend to defraud the crowd may
well be judgment proof and not respond to higher punishments. Holding
them accountable more often may be the only recourse.
One way to assure that crowdfunding does not attract fraudulent
schemes is by requiring fundraisers to exhibit costly signals that only nonfraudulent schemes can exhibit.106 In the equity context, these signals
usually take the form of filings or disclosure requirements. The U.S.
regulation requires107 such a signal, but has been criticized for the cost it
imposes on the system.108
These past performances or the company's health are assumed to be
predictive of future performances, yet, past performances can be a poor
predictor of future results. Even if the campaign creator puts good faith
effort into the startup, they might fail. Nonetheless, some measures can be
put in places to assure that campaign creators carry some liability to ensure
they do put good faith effort into the company.
To ensure such efforts, their incentives must not be completely
misaligned. First, the campaign creator should always remain the majority
equity holder109 to diminish the potential impact of the agency problem.
Aware of this issue, some platforms cap how much equity a campaign can
offer.110
Second, platforms can further incentivize fundraisers by divesting the
funds in installments after certain milestones (e.g., prototype, mass
production, etc.). This tool has been heavily used in the venture capital

106. Ginger Zhe Jin & Andrew Kato, Dividing online and offline: A case study, 74 REV. ECON.
STUDIES 981 (2007) (modelling and testing the sale of trading cards over the internet and discussing
and testing the usefulness of grading service  auditing like services for trading cards  to separate
good from bad products).
107. Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 389.
108. “The proposed S.E.C. rules, particularly those requiring audited financials and annual
reporting, have been criticized as detrimental to crowdfunding because compliance costs have been
estimated to consume more than 15 percent of the offering. The result is that few expect the S.E.C. to
adopt regulations that allow companies to use crowdfunding effectively.” Steven Davidoff Solomon,
S.E.C.’s Delay on Crowdfunding May Just Save It, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2014, 2:56 PM), http://deal
book.nytimes.com/2014/11/18/s-e-c-s-delay-on-crowdfunding-may-just-save-it-2/?_r=0.
109. As previously discussed in note 46, the agency problem occurs when separating ownership
from management. By requiring that the campaign creators have a minimum amount of equity or
interest in the company, it supports that they will self-serve and try to advance their interest by putting a
good faith effort.
110. For instance, WiSeed limits the capital sale up to twenty percent. WISEED (Mar. 24, 2016),
https:// www.wiseed.com/en/startups/lever-des-fonds.
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context.111 To some extent, all regulations have addressed this question
because they limit the amount entrepreneurs can raise.112
Third, the campaign creator could also sign a noncompete agreement
to assure that he will not jump ship at the first sign of failure. If the
entrepreneur knows that his future is tied to the company for the
foreseeable future, he will be more incentivized to give its all for the
company.
C. ENCOURAGING A WISER CROWD IN EQUITY CROWDFUNDING
Crowdfunding presents the crowd with unique investment
opportunities; but crowdfunding is not without issues. This section
discusses how some of these issues can be addressed.
1. Moral Hazard Problems
The crowd likely under-invests in due diligence for five reasons.
First, the crowd may not carry out any due diligence because they lack the
expertise to understand financial reports113 and must rely on outside due
diligence (i.e., platforms); thus, the crowd will not invest into information it
cannot understand. Second, even if they have the expertise, they can free
ride upon the due diligence of others114  including platforms, whose
livelihood depends on properly filtering these projects.115 Third, if they
have the expertise, the small size of a crowdfunding investments may not
justify the cost of performing this due diligence.116 Fourth, the crowd
111. Staged financing has been heavily used in the venture capital context and could help keep the
campaign creator's incentives aligned with the investing crowd's incentives. Paul Alan Gompers &
Joshua Lerner, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE, Ch. 8 (2004) (discussing stage financing in the context
of venture capital). Furthermore, stage financing can limit the impact of bad projects since campaign
creators would not receive the funds if they cannot reach the next stage and hence limiting the amount
that can be defrauded or lost to incompetent entrepreneurs.
112. Some policymakers have even complained that these limits were too small and talked of
increasing them already. Chance Barnett, SEC To Vote On Title III Equity Crowdfunding Rulings
October 30th, FORBES (Oct. 27, 2015, 8:11 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2015/
10/27/sec-to-vote-on-title-iii-equity-crowdfunding-rulings-october-30th/.
113. Nonrational investors may even overestimate their investment abilities. See Barberis & Thaler,
supra note 44, at 1064.
114. “To the extent that the cost of performing due diligence is high and the individual benefit low,
the crowdfunding community may systematically underinvest in due diligence; instead, funders may
free-ride on the investment decisions of others, which is feasible to do since funding information is
public and funders usually cannot be excluded.” Agrawal et al., supra note 40.
115. See, e.g., Richard Carter & Steven Manaster, Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter
Reputation, 45 J. FIN. 1045 (1990) (modeling the impact of underwriter reputations on stock prices
following an IPO; finding that the stock of companies whose IPO was underwritten by financial
companies with a higher reputation did not experience price run-ups; and concluding that prestigious
underwriters associated with lower risks and provide investors less incentive to acquire information).
116. Id.
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investors can diversify and protect against risks. Finally, investors may be
too protected to incentivize their due diligence. When other crowdfunding
participants carry the liability, investors may fall into a moral hazard trap117
 they could invest without performing their due diligence because the
liabilities of other participants assure that they can recover.
When the platform has a (legal) duty to filter projects, the crowd
seems to be less skeptical of the projects. In Europe, crowdfunding
platform comparisons provide some evidence that different liability
schemes lead to differing crowd behavior. In France, Ulule, a Paris-based
reward crowdfunding platform, quotes a success rate of sixty-five
percent.118 As a reward based crowdfunding platform, Ulule denies all
liability with respect to failed projects;119 yet, “Ulule performs an initial
validation when a project is proposed to filter out questionable projects.”120
Also in France, WiSeed, a Toulouse-based equity crowdfunding platform,
which has a three-layer filtering process, quotes a ninety-four percent
success rate after the projects go through the filtering.121 WiSeed, as a
Conseiller en Investissements Participatifs, or licensed crowdfunding
agent, carries a duty to perform a due diligence and to audit the projects. In
the U.K. in 2013, Crowdfunder, a U.K. based reward crowdfunding
platform, reported a twenty-three percent success rate,122 whereas, in 2014,
Crowdcube, its sister equity crowdfunding platform, quoted a fifty-two
percent success rate.123 Similarly, Crowdfunder denies any liability124
whereas Crowdcube is a licensed professional.
Platform comparisons in France and in the UK show that reward
based crowdfunding traditionally has a lower success rate than equity based
crowdfunding. A number of factors may explain this difference including
the size and nature of the investment. However, liability divergences also

117. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON.
REV. 941 (1963) (explaining that individuals take more risks when they carry insurance because others
will pay the costs of their risky activity).
118. Ulule Statistics, ULULE, https://www.ulule.com/stats/ (retrieved Oct. 26, 2015), https://web.arc
hive.org/web/20160214231539/http://www.ulule.com/stats/.
119. “Consequently, Ululers may not seek the Company's liability if Project Owners fail to meet
their obligations.” General Conditions of Use for the Site, ULULE, https://www.ulule.com/about/terms/
(last visited Oct. 26, 2015).
120. FAQ, ULULE, http://www.ulule.com/about/faq/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2015).
121. See Startups Funded per Year, supra note 15.
122. Grants, loans and crowdfunding  the new funding mix, CROWDFUNDER, http://www.crowd
funder.co.uk/uploads/biz_dev/special_report_grants_loans_crowdfunding.pdf (last visited Oct. 26,
2015).
123. Crowdcube Infographic, CROWDCUBE, https://www.crowdcube.com/infographic (last visited
Oct. 26, 2015).
124. Crowdcube Terms of Use, CROWDCUBE, http://www.crowdfunder.co.uk/terms-conditions (last
visited Oct. 26, 2015).
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need to be considered.125 In equity crowdfunding, the crowd relies on
filters provided by other crowdfunding participants and do not act
according to the expected principles of the Wisdom of the Crowd; in reward
crowdfunding, the crowd carries the liability.126
Two caveats should be made. First, individual investors may not have
sufficient incentive to enforce their rights through complicated litigation
because they invest only small amounts and coordination costs are high.127
Instead, they must rely on the regulator to enforce their rights against
platforms and campaign creators.
Second, having platforms bear liability and heavily filter projects
could lead to better outcomes (e.g., lower failure rate) than letting the
crowd filter projects because platforms employ experienced financial
professionals. The counterfactual (whether more platform liability leads to
worse outcome) cannot be properly tested.128 However, having too many
platform based filters arguably deprives society of a number of socially
valuable ideas: professional platforms filter projects in a different way than
the crowd and these professionals may not find a project viable that the
crowd may have supported.
2. A Role for Policymakers and Platforms
Policymakers (and platforms) have attempted to realign the crowd's
incentives. Policymakers, like Italian policymakers,129 have required that
all investors should be offered a cool-off period before the investment
becomes final. Having a period where the investors can only further
investigate and remove his investment (instead of investing) will allow
investors to focus on the information instead of investing out of fear of
missing out.130
Besides providing time to reflect, some platforms provided potential
125. Comparing country to country may be difficult because of the size of the sites. Ulule performs
an initial validation that Crowdfunder does not. Similarly, WiSeed has a three-layer filtering process
that Crowdcube does not deploy and hence filters out more projects; Crowdcube helped fund one
hundred and five projects in 2014 compared to thirteen for WiSeed. 2014 Review, CROWDCUBE,
http://www.crowdcube. com/2014/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2015).
126. If platforms (and campaigners) are not held liable, investors carry the risks directly.
127. The small amounts invested through crowdfunding do not provide individual investors with
enough private incentive to sue to enforce their rights when they must pay large litigation costs to
enforce these rights.
128. This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as the Peltzman effect, which is the effect of having
more safety regulations which lead to more risk taking and worse outcomes. See generally Sam
Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 677 (1975).
129. See CONSOB Reg. n. 18592/2013, supra note 63.
130. Hornuf & Schwienbacher, supra note 49 (observing “a small rise in investments during the last
three days of the funding period,” an effect that might be due to some investors closely watching the
funding dynamics and ultimately fearing that they will no longer be able to invest).
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investors with warnings. For instance, Crowdcube provides the following
warning:
Investing in start-ups and early stage businesses involves
risks, including illiquidity, lack of dividends, loss of
investment and dilution, and it should be done only as part of
a diversified portfolio. Crowdcube is targeted exclusively at
investors who are sufficiently sophisticated to understand
these risks and make their own investment decisions. You
will only be able to invest via Crowdcube once you are
registered as sufficiently sophisticated.131
Platforms put these warning to protect themselves against liability and
therefore, investors assume the risks of investing. The positive externality
is that these warnings help inform the crowd about the risks of investing;
however, these warnings remain vague and are relegated to the bottom of
the page. Further warnings can be read on the site but they require that the
visitors actively look for them.
Whether investors read132 or understand these warnings is difficult to
tell. Considering that crowdfunding targets nonsophisticated investors,
these bottom-of-the-page warnings are arguably insufficient considering
the risks involved.
Policymakers should encourage these platforms to use these warnings
in a more sophisticated way. First, policymakers can draw from the
European ePrivacy Directive experience.133 This directive requires that all
cookies stored on a computer be approved by the user  similar to an optin policy instead of a previously opt-out strategy.134 While the application
of this directive took different forms in different European Member
States,135 generally, websites have a tab pop out at the top or bottom of the
131. Invest in Innovative British Businesses, CROWDCUBE, https://www.crowdcube.com/#risk
WarningModal (last visited Oct. 26, 2015).
132. See e.g., Soussan Djamasbi et al., Visual Hierarchy and Viewing Behavior: An Eye Tracking
Study, HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION: DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT APPROACHES 331 (2011)
(discussing the placement of information and reading pattern of website visitors and finding that visitors
focus on the top, left, and middle of pages and fixate on face images).
133. Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 12, 2002
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic
communications sector (directive on privacy and electronic communications) amended by
2009/136/EC.
134. Id.; Council Directive 2009/136 art. 2(5), 2009 O.J. (L337) 11, 30 (EC). See also Jonathan R.
Mayer & John C. Mitchell, Third-party Web Tracking: Policy and Technology, 2012 IEEE SYMPOSIUM
ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY 412, 418 (2012).
135. Matthew S. Kirsch, Do-Not-Track: Revising the EU's Data Protection Framework to Require
Meaningful Consent for Behavioral Advertising, 18 RICH. JL & TECH. 1, 8 (2011) (providing examples
of France and the Netherlands to demonstrate different applications of the same EU directive).
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screen, which offers visitors two or three options: consent, continue
navigating the website as form of consent, and a direct link to the cookie
policy. The warning should be displayed in the same way instead of
putting them at the bottom of the page.
Second, platforms can help educate the nonprofessional crowd. They
can refuse investment until the potential investors fulfill certain actions.
They should ensure that the crowd understands the risks involved and the
platform could benefit from explaining investment risks to nonprofessional investors.
Educating investors can take many forms: It can be passive or active.
Passive education relies on the investors receiving information. To ensure
that these tactics function, platforms can deploy behavioral economic tools
to help educate nonprofessional investors. For instance, platform can use
social norming.136 Through social norming, behavioral economists induce
individuals to change their behavior by informing them what other
members of the population are doing i.e., the norm. Platforms could
present information about investors within a prompt before they can invest.
Such a prompt could read: “The average professional investor spends 2hrs
estimating whereas the average non-professional investor spends less than
10 minutes.”137 Messages like those could induce the average investors to
do further due diligence.
Active education requires investors’ participation. Before a member
of the crowd can invest or even before every investment, he could be
prompted to take a test targeted at providing information. The prompt
could test the investor's knowledge about a number of risks associated with
financial investments. For instance, a prompt for the failure rate of startups
could look like: “Within 5 year of its creation, what percentage of startup
fail?: (a) 30%; (b) 50%; (c) 70%.”138 Avenues of education can include
due diligence, risk diversity, share dilution, and other concepts that may not
be obvious to a nonprofessional investor.
Platforms may not, however, implement this investor filtering of their
own volition and may require a push.139 Policymakers may provide this
136. See, e.g., Rene Van Bavel, Gabriele Esposito & Tom Baranowski, Is Anybody Doing It? An
Experimental Study of the Effect of Normative Messages on Intention to Do Physical Activity, 14 BMC
PUB. HEALTH 778 (2014) (testing the impact of social norms on the intent of exercise).
137. Note that these times in no way reflect estimations.
138. If done for every investment, the answers’ order and the wrong answers could be changed at
every prompt to ensure that the investors do not just always select the same choice but instead read the
prompts and learn from them.
139. In crowdfunding, investments are generally small; hence, platforms need a high volume of
business  whether through repeat business or economies of scale. Platforms have a private incentive
to provide a positive experience: if investors feel that a platform has taken advantage of their lack of
experience, then visitors will not repeat their interaction and give the platform bad reviews. Educating
investors can enhance the experience. Relying on these incentives and non-regulatory mechanisms has
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extra push. Policymakers can protect investors by requiring that they
become more educated before they invest.140 Policymakers, much like the
E.U. ePrivacy Directive did, could regulate how much information is
disclosed and how it is disclosed  including whether overfunding can
occur as discussed above.
Policymakers are already regulating a number of crowdfunding
aspects. For instance, policymakers in the U.S. and U.K. have limited the
amount of funds each member of the nonprofessional investing crowd can
invest.141 These forms of regulations have been described as paternalistic
regulations.142 Policymakers do not trust the crowd to do what is in their
best interest and therefore limits their (investment) choices. Restriction exante limits the risk to which investors are subjected whereas education
encourages investors to take educated risk.
V. CONCLUSION
Crowdfunding offers an avenue for nontraditional projects and nontraditional investors. Harvesting its potential should not come at the
expense of exposing nonprofessional investors to dangerous behavior.
Some platforms have already complained that too much regulation
could harm the process.143 Platforms have some private incentives to
ensure that investors do not fall to abusive behavior; however, this
incentive remains limited and regulations have a role to play.
Campaign creators have little to no private incentive to ensure that
investors benefits. While some entrepreneurs become serial entrepreneurs,
crowdfunding is not old enough to test whether reputational safeguard can
play a role in this world. Fraud and incompetence are not crowdfunding
specific issues: they occurred before crowdfunding existed.144

not helped in other settings such as the penny stock. See, e.g., Kevin C. Bartels, Click Here to Buy the
Next Microsoft: The Penny Stock Rules, Online Microcap Fraud, and the Unwary Investor, 75 IND. L.J.
353 (2000) (discussing stock fraud throughout the years, the impact of the internet on penny stock
fraud, and potential solutions).
140. Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1
(2003) (discussing various investor biases and arguing that the SEC should educate investors on these
biases instead of limiting their investments and requiring disclosure).
141. Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at Table 2.
142. See, e.g., Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the
Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism”, 151 U. PENN. L. REV. 1211 (2003) (discussing the cost and
benefits of regulating the whole population because some individuals do not behave entirely rationally
and describing such paternalistic methods as requiring and standardizing information disclosure).
143. See, e.g., Ramos, supra, note 100.
144. William Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Comment on the Securities
and Exchange Commission's Regulatory Initiatives Under the JOBS Act: Title III, Crowdfunding (Aug.
8, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-iii/jobstitleiii-121.pdf (comparing crowdfunding to
penny stock and the fraud associated with these kinds of IPOs).
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Crowdfunding can, however, facilitate their popularization.
Investors have private incentives to assure the system works;
nonetheless, these incentives have limitations. Even if the investors are
assumed to be fully rational, they may not perform enough due diligence
and when they are not fully rational, they may put too much on certain
pieces of information.
Investors, and particularly non-professional
investors, suffer from a number of biases145 such as overconfidence about
the information they gather or about their own ability. Platforms and
policymakers have a place to play in curbing these biases.
Some argue that too many regulations could harm the process more
than help them.146 However, regulations have spurred investment in some
occasions because it legitimized the process.147 At what point regulation
becomes too much is difficult to tell, and will likely require a trial and error
process.

145. See Hakenes & Schlegel, supra note 39.
146. See, e.g., Ethan Mollick, The Danger of Crowding Out the Crowd With Equity Crowdfunding,
PUB. POL’Y INITIATIVE ISSUE BRIEF 1 (Aug. 2014) (discussing the need to not restrain the investing
crowd in order to garner its full potential).
147. Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 2.

